High-Speed Pursuits: Police Officer and Municipal
Liability for Accidents Involving the Pursued and
an Innocent Third Party
I.

INTRODUCTION

An automobile is being chased by the police at high speeds.
Suddenly, the driver of the pursued vehicle loses control and collides with another automobile, causing severe injury or death to
an innocent third party. Although the preceding scenario seems
to describe an event relatively rare in contemporary society, it
occurs far more often than the average citizen might suspect.'
Furthermore, in New Jersey, police officers have traditionally
been immune from civil liability to third parties who were injured
by the fleeing suspect.2 The Appellate Division of the New Jersey
Superior Court recently examined the foundations of this immunity in Smith v. Nieves.'
Despite contrary prior law, the Smith court held that law enforcement officials may be liable for injuries inflicted on innocent
victims by the driver of a pursued vehicle.4 The court further
held that a municipality may also be vicariously liable for a police
officer's negligence, or directly liable for failing to train officers
properly for participation in high-speed pursuits.5 The Smith rulI See generally Physicians for Automotive Safety, Rapid Pursuit by the Police:
Causes, Hazards, Consequences 6, 14 (c. 1968) (unpublished study listing statistics
that demonstrate large number of injuries and deaths caused by high-speed pursuits); Struck, Police Taking the Heat for Hot-PursuitPolicies, The Sun (Baltimore), Jan.
20, 1985, at 10A, col.3 (study by California Highway Patrol found that 29% of highspeed pursuits culminated in accidents, 11% resulted in injuries, and 1% ended in
death); Herald-News (New Jersey), Dec. 30, 1984, at A8, col. 1 ("[mjore than 500
Americans die and more than 1,000 sustain major injuries each year as a result of
rapid police pursuit of law breakers"); M ore Cops Die m Car Chases than by Guns, Bergen Record (NewJersey), Aug. 12, 1979, at A 18, col.1 (survey by NewJersey Police
Traffic Officers Association revealed that motor vehicle accidents were the overwhelming cause of state police fatalities). But see Beckman, High-Speed Chases: In
Pursuit of a Balanced Policy, POLICE CHIEF, Jan. 1983, at 34 (questioning validity of
existing research on high-speed chases).
2 See Blanchard v. Town of Kearny, 145 N.J. Super. 246, 248-49, 367 A.2d 464,
465 (Law Div. 1976), aFd, 153 N.J. Super. 158, 379 A.2d 288 (App. Div. 1977)
(interpreting Roll v. Timberman, 94 N.J. Super. 530, 229 A.2d 281 (App. Div.
1967)); see also infra notes 11-42 and accompanying text (discussion of the Roll and
Blanchard cases).
3 197 N.J. Super. 609, 485 A.2d 1066 (App. Div. 1984).
4 Id. at 612-13, 485 A.2d at 1067-68.
5 See id. at 613-14, 485 A.2d at 1068. High-speed pursuits are sometimes re-
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ing is significant because it provides a remedy for innocent victims6 and draws attention to the necessity of preventing 7 the
needless tragedies that can result from high-speed pursuits.
This comment, however, does not contend that high-speed
pursuits are always unnecessary. 8 Society has compelling interests in both the apprehension of lawbreakers and the protection
of the innocent public. Because these interests often conflict
with one another during a high-speed chase, police pursuit
presents several difficult public policy questions. 9 This comment
will attempt to suggest answers to these questions by first reviewing New Jersey law in the area of high-speed pursuits.'0 It will
then examine the necessity of high-speed pursuits and the possible alternatives that exist. The comment will also discuss the various policies and guidelines that are currently used by police
departments. Finally, it will analyze potential police and municipal liability for injuries that occur as a result of negligent highspeed pursuits.
ferred to as hot pursuits. See, e.g., Hot Pursuit, Transcript of 60 Minutes, Nov. 9,
1980 (available from CBS Television Network) [hereinafter cited as 60 Minutes].
6 See Smith, 197 N.J. at 612-14, 485 A.2d at 1067-68 (holding police officers and
municipalities potentially liable for injuries sustained by innocent third parties during high-speed pursuits).
7 The Smith court dealt only with the legal issue of negligence and failed to
examine any of the public policy aspects of high-speed chases-such as the benefits
and shortcomings of pursuit and the possible alternatives to pursuit. See infra notes
71-81 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale of the Smith decision). By
imposing potential liability upon municipalities and police officers, however, the
opinion compels police departments to reexamine their current practices. See generally Goode, The Imposition of Vicarious Liability to the Torts of Police Officers: Considerations
of Policy, 10 MELB. U.L. REV. 47 (1975) (discussing imposition of vicarious liability
as a deterrent to the makers of police policy).
8 When a chase does become necessary, adequate training in high-speed pursuits and detailed pursuit policies are needed to ensure that the chance of injury to
an innocent person is kept to a minimum. See generally infra notes 96-147 and accompanying text (discussing the need for guidelines and training programs).
9 See Craig, The Innocent Victims of a Police Action, 26 U. NEw BRUNSWICK L.J. 34
(1977). The author notes that police officers have a general duty to preserve the
peace and, when necessary, to arrest offenders. Id. at 36. To be effective in the
performance of these duties, the officer must sometimes act in a way that would
normally qualify as a tort, such as driving over the speed limit to catch a fleeing
criminal. Id. at 34. While this often involves risk to the general public, the officer's
effectiveness would be undermined if he was not granted some protection from tort
liability. Id. Thus, a police officer is "insulated from ... civil liability . . . as long
as he acts on reasonable. . . grounds." Id. The author states that a problem arises
in determining whether the officer has overstepped his authority and is no longer
acting reasonably. Id.
It See infra notes 11-81 and accompanying text. Although this comment will focus on the law in New Jersey, the problems and possible remedies inherent in highspeed pursuits are applicable to every jurisdiction.

1986]

COMMENT

II.

THE LAW IN NEW JERSEY

In 1967, the appellate division decided Roll v. Timberman,"
the leading case in New Jersey concerning police liability for injuries caused by the pursued during a high-speed chase.' 2 On
March 14, 1964, Wesley Martin, a Harrison Township part-time
police officer, approached an automobile parked with its lights
off.' 3 As Martin drew nearer, the driver of the car, Bruce Timberman, turned on the car's lights and drove off at an excessive rate
of speed. 14 Timberman then drove through a stop sign, and Martin began his pursuit.' 5 Although Martin drove at speeds of
ninety to one hundred miles per hour, he could not overtake
Timberman.' 6 When Timberman attempted to elude Martin by
passing a small truck, he collided head-on with a vehicle driven
by Charles Roll.' 7 Roll suffered personal injuries, and his wife
was killed. 8
In a lawsuit against Martin and Harrison Township,' 9 a jury
awarded Charles Roll damages against both defendants .2 ° The
94 N.J. Super. 530, 229 A.2d 281 (App. Div. 1967).
12 Id. at 536, 229 A.2d at 284. Roll was the first New Jersey case to deal with the
issue of police liability for damage caused by the pursued. See id.
13 Id. at 533-34, 229 A.2d at 282. While Martin was on patrol duty, he used his
own car, which Harrison Township had equipped with a siren, a police radio, and a
flashing red light. Id.
14 Id. at 534, 229 A.2d at 282-83.
15 Id., 229 A.2d at 283. Timberman testified that although he saw a car pursuing
him, he did not know it was the police. Id.
'1

16 Id.

17 Id. Timberman was driving in the southbound lane of a two-lane road in
Mantua Township. Id. at 532, 229 A.2d at 282. When he attempted to pass the
truck, Timberman cut into the northbound lane and smashed into Roll's oncoming
vehicle. Id.
18 Id.
19 See id. at 532-33, 229 A.2d at 282. Roll also included Timberman in the action, but settled with Timberman's insurance company before trial. Id. at 532, 229
A.2d at 282. The complaint against the remaining defendants alleged negligence
by Martin and active wrongdoing by Harrison Township. Id. It further alleged that
the municipality was liable for Martin's negligence under a theory of respondeat
superior. Id. Martin died prior to the suit, and Roll named the officer's estate as a
defendant. Id. The municipality instituted a third party action for indemnification
and contribution against Martin's estate, and the estate made a similar cross-claim
against Timberman. Id.
20 Id. at 533, 229 A.2d at 282. At the conclusion of the trial, the judge dismissed
the active wrongdoing claim against the township. Id. Thus, the jury decided only
the questions of Martin's negligence and the municipality's vicarious liability. Id.
The jury awarded Roll $12,500. Id. The trial court reduced the award to $6250,
however, because of the settlement with Timberman. Id. In the third party indemnification action against Martin's estate, the trial judge awarded Harrison Township
$6250. Id.
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appellate court reversed, however, reasoning that Martin should
escape tort liability because police officers have a duty to apprehend reckless drivers. 2 ' Although the court recognized that Martin's pursuit instigated Timberman's flight, it found that "the
legal or proximate cause of the accident" was Timberman's reckless driving. 22 The Roll court concluded that Martin had not acted negligently in the high-speed pursuit.23 In adopting the
above reasoning, the court rejected the view that police liability is
a question of fact for the jury. 24 Because it found Martin not liable, the court also reversed the judgment against Harrison
Township, 25 which was based on the doctrine of respondeat
26
superior.
The first published case to interpret the Roll decision was
Blanchardv. Town of Kearny, 27 a case decided almost ten years after
Roll. 28 On July 14, 1974, James Heslen of the Kearny Police De21 See id. at 536, 229 A.2d at 284. Police officers have a statutory duty to enforce
the motor vehicle laws. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:5-1 (West Cum. Supp. 1984-1985).
When a violation of the motor vehicle laws takes place in the presence of a police
officer, the officer may arrest the violator without a warrant. Id. § 39:5-25.
22 See Roll, 94 N.J. Super. at 537-38, 229 A.2d at 284-85.
23 Id. at 538, 229 A.2d at 285. The Roll court noted that police officers are exempt from speed regulations in certain circumstances. Id. at 535-36, 229 A.2d at
283-84. A New Jersey statute specifically provides that "all police officers, while the
officers are engaged in the apprehension of violators of the law, or of persons
charged with, or suspected of, a violation, are exempt from the provisions of this
chapter relating to speed." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-103 (West Cum. Supp. 19841985).
24 See Roll, 94 N.J. Super. at 537, 229 A.2d at 284. The Roll court noted that the
majority view "holds that the police officer is not liable" for injuries caused by the
pursued. Id. at 536, 229 A.2d at 284. The court recognized two reasons behind the
majority view:
(1) it is the duty of a police officer to apprehend those whose reckless
driving makes use of the highway dangerous to others; (2) the proximate
cause of the accident is the reckless driving of the pursued, notwithstanding recognition of the fact that the police pursuit contributed to
the pursued's reckless driving.
Id. The court stated that it was "in accord with the majority view as above expressed." Id. at 537, 229 A.2d at 284.
25 Id. at 538, 229 A.2d at 285.
26 See infra note 42 (definition of respondeat superior in context of public entity
liability).
27 145 N.J. Super. 246, 367 A.2d 464 (Law Div. 1976), afd, 153 N.J. Super. 158,
379 A.2d 288 (App. Div. 1977).
28 See id. at 246, 367 A.2d at 464. Blanchard and Roll contained the identical issue
of whether the police were liable for injuries caused by the pursued during a highspeed chase. See id. at 248-49, 367 A.2d at 465. The two cases differed only in that
the plaintiff in Blanchard was a passenger in the vehicle being pursued. See id. at
247, 367 A.2d at 464. By contrast, the plaintiff in Roll was driving a third car. See
Roll, 94 N.J. Super. at 532, 229 A.2d at 282.
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partment was operating a marked patrol car. 29 Heslen observed
an automobile driven by John Barnowski make a wide turn and
almost hit another vehicle.3" Heslen tried to stop Barnowski, and
a high-speed chase ensued.3 ' Barnowski passed a red light and
reached speeds of eighty to ninety miles per hour before colliding with several parked cars.32 Barnowski was killed and his passenger, Larry Blanchard, sustained injuries.
Blanchard initiated a personal injury suit against both the
police officer and the Town of Kearny. 4 The trial court, how35
ever, granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
The court interpreted the Roll case as granting complete immunity to police officers for damages caused by a police-pursued vehicle.36 Thus, the only issue before the court was whether the
New Jersey Tort Claims Act 37 had disposed of that immunity.38
Although the Act provides that public employees may be liable
for their negligence,3 9 the court found that the legislature had
preserved existing immunities established by case law.4" The
29 Blanchard, 145 N.J. Super. at 247, 367 A.2d at 464.
30 Id., 367 A.2d at 464-65.
31 Id. at 247-48, 367 A.2d at 465. The court noted that even if Heslen had not
observed a possible motor vehicle violation, he had a right to stop Barnowski. Id. at
248 n.1, 367 A.2d at 465 n.l. When Blanchard was decided, police officers were
"authorized to stop motor vehicles at random and demand production of the operator's driver's license and motor vehicle registration." State v. Gray, 59 N.J. 563,
567, 285 A.2d 1, 3 (1971); cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:3-29 (West Cum. Supp. 19841985) (driver must exhibit license and registration when requested to do so by an
officer in the performance of his duties). Police officers are no longer permitted to
take such action, however. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (police
officer may not stop vehicle at random to check license and registration; he must
have "articulable and reasonable suspicion" that driver has violated the law).
32 Blanchard, 145 N.J. Super. at 248, 367 A.2d at 465.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 247, 367 A.2d at 464.
35 Id. at 249, 367 A.2d at 466.
36 Id. at 248-49, 367 A.2d at 465.
37 Ch. 45, 1972 N.J. Laws 140 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:1-1 to: 12-3
(West 1982)). The Legislature passed the Tort Claims Act approximately five years
after the Roll decision. See Roll, 94 N.J. Super. at 530, 229 A.2d at 281.
38 Blanchard, 145 N.J. Super. at 249, 367 A.2d at 465.
39 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:3-1(a) (West 1982). This section states: "[e]xcept as
otherwise provided by this act, a public employee is liable for injury caused by his
act or omission to the same extent as a private person." Id.
40 Blanchard, 145 N.J. Super. at 249, 367 A.2d at 465; see also Steward v. Borough
of Magnolia, 134 N.J. Super. 312, 320, 340 A.2d 678, 683 (App. Div. 1975) (Tort
Claims Act preserves immunities granted by case law). The Act specifically provides that "[t]he liability of a public employee established by this act is subject to any
immunity of a public employee provided by law and is subject to any defenses that would
be available to the public employee if he were a private person." N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 59:3-1(b) (West 1982) (emphasis added).
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court therefore held the police officer immune from liability.4 '
The court also dismissed the case against the municipality because the Act stipulated that a municipality could not be vicariously liable when its employee was not liable.4"
After the Roll and Blanchard decisions, police officers and
municipalities were presumed to be immune from liability when
third parties were injured by a fleeing driver. 4 3 A few months after the Blanchard decision, however, a superior court assignment
judge recognized that a municipality could be held liable for its
negligence in improperly training its employees to conduct highspeed pursuits.44 In Swellick v. Mottola,4 5 two North Arlington police officers observed a Buick driven by Anthony Mottola pass another vehicle on the right. 46 Mottola ignored the officers' request
to pull over, and a chase began. 47 The patrol car traveled in excess of eighty miles per hour, yet the officers were unable to catch
Mottola. 48 The chase ended with Mottola's car smashing head-on
into a Chevrolet Vega driven by William Swellick.4 9
Swellick commenced an action against the police officers for
41 Blanchard, 145 N.J. Super. at 249, 367 A,2d at 465.
42 Id. The Act provides that "[a] public entity is not liable for an injury resulting
from an act or omission of a public employee where the public employee is not
liable." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-2(b) (West 1982). The doctrine of vicarious liability,
or respondeat superior, was expressly incorporated in the Tort Claims Act: "A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of a public
employee within the scope of his employment in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual under like circumstances." Id. § 59:2-2(a). See generally McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 190-96, 162 A.2d 820, 830-33 (1960)
(discussion of principles of vicarious liability).
43 See Smith v. Nieves, 197 N.J. Super. 609. 611-12, 485 A.2d 1066, 1067 (App.
Div. 1984).
44 Swellick v. Mottola, No. L-24285-75, slip op. at 2-3 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div.
Apr. 19, 1977). The law division decided the Blanchard case on November 23,
1976. See Blanchard, 145 NJ. Super. at 246, 367 A.2d at 464. The case was affirmed
by the appellate court, however, on October 19, 1977, approximately six months
after the Swellick opinion was rendered. See Blanchard v. Town of Kearny, 153 N.J.
Super. 158, 379 A.2d 288 (App. Div. 1977).
45 No. L-24285-75 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Apr. 19, 1977).
46 Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
at 1, 2, Swellick v. Mottola, No. L-24285-75 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Apr. 19,
1977) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiffs Brief].
47 Id. at 2. The officers in the pursuing patrol car activated the domelight and
siren before commencing pursuit. Id. at 1, 2.
48 Id. at 4.
49 Id. at 7. A second North Arlington patrol car had joined the chase and also
traveled at 80 miles per hour at a distance of 15 to 20 feet behind the first patrol
car. Id. at 6. Mottola was traveling north when he crashed into Swellick's car in the
southbound lane. See id. at 7.
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negligence. 5" He also sued the Borough of North Arlington,
pleading vicarious liability and negligence for failing to train its
officers. 5' During the discovery process, Swellick learned that the
North Arlington Police Department did not have a policy regarding high-speed pursuits. 52 Furthermore, the only instruction regarding high-speed pursuits received by the driver of the patrol
car occurred on his first day of work, when he was told by a lieuthese facts, both detenant to "use caution. ' '5 3 Notwithstanding
54
fendants moved for summary judgment.
Judge Trautwein, following Roll and Blanchard, held that the
police officers were immune from liability. 55 He ruled, however,
that Roll was not determinative of the direct claim of negligence
against the municipality.5 6 judge Trautwein held that the municipality could be responsible for failing to train and supervise its
officers. 5 7 He therefore denied summary judgment on that issue. 5 8 The issue never reached trial, however, because Swellick
settled with the municipality.5 9
Recently, in Smith v. Nieves, 6" the appellate division effected a
dramatic change in NewJersey law without overruling Roll.61 The
Smith case involved a high-speed pursuit on May 15, 1980 between police officers of Nutley and Belleville and a car driven by
Rosendo Nieves.6 2 The Nutley officers claimed that Nieves was
driving erratically and that they thought he was drunk.6 3 The
50 See Complaint at 3, Swellick v. Mottola, No. L-24285-75 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law

Div. Apr. 19, 1977).
51 See id.
52 Plaintiffs Brief, supra note 46, at 7.
53 Id. at 8.
54 Swellick, slip op. at 1.

55 See id. at 2 n.1, 3.
56 See id. at 3. With respect to the vicarious liability claim, Judge Trautwein
pointed out that under § 59:2-2(b) of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, a public
entity is not liable for an employee's acts if the employee is not liable. Id. at 2 n. 1;
see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-2(b) (West 1982). He further stated that the statute ap-

pears to give total immunity to a municipality because the police officer cannot be
found liable. Swellick, slip op. at 2 n.l. The judge held, however, that § 59:2-2(b),

in conjunction with Roll, only grants immunity to a municipality from vicarious liability and not from actual wrongdoing. Id. at 3.
57 Swellick, slip op. at 2.
58 See id. at 3.
59 Herald-News (NewJersey), Oct. 19, 1978, at B12, col.6. Swellick instituted a
one million dollar lawsuit against the Borough of North Arlington, but settled the

case for $65,000. Id.
60 197 N.J. Super. 609, 485 A.2d 1066 (App. Div. 1984).
61 See id. at 612-13, 485 A.2d at 1067-68.
62 Id. at 611, 485 A.2d at 1067.
63 Star-Ledger (Newark), Dec. 25, 1984, at 18, col. 6.
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chase between Nieves and the police reached speeds of sixty to
ninety miles per hour6 4 before Nieves crashed into an automobile
driven by Sion Smith.6 5 Smith was killed as a result of the
accident.6 6
Smith's family sued the police officers and their municipalities under several different negligence theories. 67 The trial court,
however, granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 68 In reaching its decision, the court relied on Roll and used
the same analysis employed by the Blanchard court.6 9 On appeal,
the summary judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded
for trial."
The appellate division in Smith expressly disagreed with the
Blanchard court's interpretation of Roll.7 The Smith court posited
that Roll was decided on a negligence theory rather than an immunity theory. 7 2 The court stated that Roll did not establish absolute nonliability for police officers in high-speed chases; it only
determined that the officers under the particular circumstances
of Roll had not been negligent. 73 Thus, the court held that an
officer may be liable for acting negligently in the execution of a
high-speed pursuit. 4
The Smith court also examined the issue of whether the New
Jersey Tort Claims Act provided the municipality with immunity
when the municipality was directly negligent.7 5 The plaintiff's
complaint charged the municipalities with failure to train their
police officers to execute high-speed pursuits properly.7 6 The
Smith, 197 N.J. Super. at 611, 485 A.2d at 1067.
65 Star-Ledger (Newark), Dec. 25, 1984, at 1, col. 4.
66 Smith, 197 N.J. Super. at 611, 485 A.2d at 1067.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 See id. at 611-12, 485 A.2d at 1067; see also supra note 36 and accompanying
text (Blanchardcourt's interpretation of Roll).
70 Smith, 197 N.J. Super. at 615, 485 A.2d at 1069. The appellate court's ruling
was a unanimous decision written by Judge Antell and joined by Judges Coleman
and Simpson. Id. at 611, 485 A.2d at 1067.
71 Id. at 612, 485 A.2d at 1067.
72 Id. at 612-13, 485 A.2d at 1067-68. The Smith court found support for its
contention by examining the cases cited by Roll. See id. The court stated that all of
these cases were resolved in terms "of negligence and proximate cause, not in
terms of immunity." Id. at 613, 485 A.2d at 1067.
73 See id. at 612, 485 A.2d at 1067. The court noted that the Roll opinion did not
suggest that the police would have been immune if the record had shown some
evidence of negligence. Id.
64

74 Id.
75 See id. at 613-14, 485 A.2d at 1068.
76

Id. at 613, 485 A.2d at 1068.

1986]

COMMENT

109

municipalities countered that the Tort Claims Act barred direct
claims against them for their discretionary acts, 7 7 such as the establishment of training programs. 78 The Smith court, however,
held that public entities could be liable if the discretionary action
was "palpably unreasonable. ' 79 The court stated that palpably
unreasonable action could be established by determining how
the municipality had utilized its resources when faced with competing priorities.80 Because the record was barren of any relevant
information from which such a determination could be made, this
81
issue was remanded to the trial court.
III.

THE LAW IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

The case law in other jurisdictions is split on the issue of
police liability when an accident occurs between the pursued and
an innocent third party.8 2 The cases ruling that there was no police liability can be interpreted in two ways. Either the court limited its holding to the particular facts of the case, or the court
77 Id. at 614, 485 A.2d at 1068. The municipalities relied on the following provision of the Tort Claims Act:
A public entity is not liable for the exercise of discretion when, in the
face of competing demands, it determines whether and how to utilize or
apply existing resources, including those allocated for equipment, facilities and personnel unless a court concludes that the determination of
the public entity was palpably unreasonable. Nothing in this section
shall exonerate a public entity for negligence arising out of acts or omissions of its employees in carrying out their ministerial functions.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-3(d) (West 1982).
78 See Smith, 197 N.J. Super. at 614, 485 A.2d at 1068.
79 See id. (citing Brown v. Brown, 86 N.J. 565, 578-79, 432 A.2d 493, 500 (1981);
Longo v. Santoro, 195 N.J. Super. 507, 518, 480 A.2d 934, 940 (App. Div. 1984));
see also infra notes 177-179 (discussion of the term "palpably unreasonable").
80 Smith, 197 N.J. Super. at 614, 485 A.2d at 1068.
81 See id. at 614, 615, 485 A.2d at 1068, 1069.
82 The following cases support liability of a police officer or municipality: Myers
v. Town of Harrison, 438 F.2d 293 (2d Cir.) (applying New York law), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 828 (1971); Schatz v. Cutler, 395 F. Supp. 271 (D. Vt. 1975) (applying
Vermont law); City of Sacramento v. Superior Court, 131 Cal. App. 3d 395, 182
Cal. Rptr. 443 (1982); Gibson v. City of Pasadena, 83 Cal. App. 3d 651, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 68 (1978); Sparks v. City of Compton, 64 Cal. App. 3d 592, 134 Cal. Rptr.
684 (1976); Tetro v. Town of Stratford, 189 Conn. 601, 458 A.2d 5 (1983); Reed v.
City of Winter Park, 253 So.2d 475 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Town of Mount
Dora v. Bryant, 128 So.2d 4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Sundin v. Hughes, 107 Ill.
App. 2d 195, 246 N.E.2d 100 (1969); Fiser v. City of Ann Arbor, 417 Mich. 461,
339 N.W.2d 413 (1983); Selkowitz v. County of Nassau, 58 A.D.2d 888, 396
N.Y.S.2d 885 (1977), afld on other grounds, 45 N.Y.2d 97, 379 N.E.2d 1140, 408
N.Y.S.2d 10 (1978); Alexander v. City of New York, 53 A.D.2d 846, 385 N.Y.S.2d
788 (1976), afd, 43 N.Y.2d 659, 371 N.E.2d 534, 400 N.Y.S.2d 816 (1977); Thain
v. City of New York, 35 A.D.2d 545, 313 N.Y.S.2d 484 (1970), afd, 30 N.Y.2d 524,
280 N.E.2d 892, 330 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1972); Jansen v. State, 60 Misc. 2d 36, 301
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ruled that as a matter of law the police officers' actions could
never be the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Although
the decisions are unclear as to which interpretation is correct, the
current trend is to view the facts on a case-by-case basis in order
to determine whether the police officers were negligent.8"
Another factor that has had an effect on the question of police liability has been the enactment of tort claims acts and similar
statutes in many states. 4 These statutes range from granting almost total immunity to municipalities and their employees 85 to
abolishment of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in certain circumstances. 86 Some statutes provide that a police officer is immune unless his actions are grossly negligent.87 Others stipulate
N.Y.S.2d 811 (Ct. Cl. 1968), afd, 32 A.D.2d 889, 302 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (1969); Mason
v. Bitton, 85 Wash. 2d 321, 534 P.2d 1360 (1975).
The courts refused to impose liability on a police officer or municipality in the
following cases: United States v. Hutchins, 268 F.2d 69 (6th Cir. 1959) (applying
Tennessee law); West Virginia v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 263 F. Supp. 88 (S.D.W.
Va. 1967) (applying West Virginia law); Bratt v. City of San Francisco, 50 Cal. App.
3d 550, 123 Cal. Rptr. 774 (1975); Pagels v. City of San Francisco, 135 Cal. App. 2d
152, 286 P.2d 877 (1955); Draper v.City of Los Angeles, 91 Cal. App. 2d 315, 205
P.2d 46 (1949); Chambers v. Ideal Pure Milk Co., 245 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. 1952);
Morris v. Combs' Adm'r, 304 Ky. 187, 200 S.W.2d 281 (1947); Taylor v. City of
Alexandria, 261 So.2d 92 (La. Ct. App. 1972); Dunn v. State, 29 N.Y.2d 313, 277
N.E.2d 647, 327 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1971); Wrubel v. State, 11 Misc. 2d 878, 174
N.Y.S.2d 687 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
83 Earlier cases granted summary judgment against a cause of action based on a
police officer's negligence. See, e.g., Wrubel v. State, 11 Misc. 2d 878, 174 N.Y.S.
2d 687 (Ct. Cl. 1958). Recent cases, however, tend to let the jury decide the issue
of negligence. See, e.g., Selkowitz v. County of Nassau, 58 A.D.2d 888, 396
N.Y.S.2d 885 (1977), affd on other grounds, 45 N.Y.2d 97, 379 N.E.2d 1140, 408
N.Y.S.2d 10 (1978).
84 See, e.g., infra notes 85-88. While many states have enacted some kind of tort
claims act relating to sovereign immunity, there are still some states that rely solely
on their common law. See Gauvin v. City of New Haven, 187 Conn. 180, 445 A.2d 1
(1982) (immunity from lawsuit depends on whether employee was performing a
governmental or ministerial function).
85 E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2901 (1979); see also Matthews v. Martin, 280 Ark.
345, 658 S.W.2d 374 (1983) (immunity granted to municipalities by statute extends
to city officials and employees acting in their official capacity). See generally Harrington v. City of Greenbrier, 262 Ark. 773, 561 S.W. 2d 302 (1978) (holding municipal
corporation immune from tort action); Chandler v. Pulaski County, 247 Ark. 262,
445 S.W.2d 96 (1969) (holding county immune from tort action).
86 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1212 (1981) (abolishing the defense of sovereign
immunity when the District is sued for negligent operation of a motor vehicle by an
employee). The District of Columbia also provides, however, that actions against
employees for negligent operation of a vehicle within the scope of their employment
are generally barred. Id. § 1-1215.
87 E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1015 (1978). This statute states that a police
officer in pursuit of a suspect is not protected "from the consequences of his reckless disregard for the safety of others." Id. In Vermont, "[rieckless disregard for the
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that an officer can never be liable, even though the municipality
can be accountable for the officer's negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior.88
The great disparity among the various jurisdictions on the
issue of liability for high-speed chases can lead to anomalous results. For example, in Biscoe v. Arlington County, 89 a police officer
from Arlington County, Virginia chased a bank robber across a
bridge into a crowded District of Columbia street. 90 The fleeing
vehicle collided with another car before pinning the plaintiff
against a lamppost. 9' The plaintiff, who lost both his legs,92 was
able to win a judgment of $4.35 million 93 because the District of
Columbia does not recognize the doctrine of sovereign immunity
in automobile cases.94 If the accident had occurred on the other
side of the bridge, however, recovery would have been prohibited because Virginia retains the principle of sovereign
95
immunity.

IV.
A.

POLICY ISSUES

Criteriafor High-Speed Pursuit Policies

Lawsuits against police officers, police departments, and mu96
nicipalities have increased dramatically over the past few years.
safety of others is the equivalent of gross negligence." Schatz v. Cutler, 395 F.
Supp. 271, 274 (D. Vt. 1975) (citing Rivard v. Roy, 124 Vt. 32, 35, 196 A.2d 497,
500 (1963)).
88 E.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 17004 (West 1971). This statute specifically grants
immunity to a public employee "in the immediate pursuit of an actual or suspected
violator of the law." Id. The Vehicle Code also provides that a public entity is liable
for the negligent acts of an employee operating a vehicle within the scope of his
employment. Id.§ 17001; see also Brummett v. County of Sacramento, 21 Cal. 3d
880, 582 P.2d 952, 148 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1978) (examining the issue of police liability
under California statutes).
89 738 F.2d 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 909 (1985).
90 See id. at 1354-55; Wash. Post, Jan. 15, 1985, at B3, col. 5.
9'1 Biscoe, 738 F.2d at 1355. The plaintiff, Alvin Biscoe, was walking during his
lunch hour at the time of the accident. Wash. Post, Jan. 15, 1985, at B3, col.5.
92 Biscoe, 738 F.2d at 1355.
93 See id. at 1356. Thejury awarded $4 million to the plaintiff, Alvin Biscoe, and
$1 million to his wife, Eleanor. Id. The award to the wife was reduced to $350,000
on remittitur. Id.
94 See supra note 86. District of Columbia law was applied because application of
Virginia law would have frustrated the District's policy against sovereign immunity
in automobile cases. See Biscoe, 738 F.2d at 1357.
95 Wash. Post, Jan. 15, 1985, at B3, col.6.
96 See Blodgett, People v. Police, 71 A.B.A.J., Feb. 1985, at 36, 36; Territo, Citizen
Safety: Key Element in Police Pursuit Policy, 18 TRIAL, Aug. 1982, at 30, 31; see also
Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipalities liable for violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1871). See generally Hagglund, Liability of Police Officers
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According to Dr. George Kirkham, a criminal justice consultant, 9 7 one of the main categories of lawsuits against police "involves a high-speed police chase in which the pursued driver hits
someone else." '9 8 In response to these actions, some police departments have developed policies and guidelines for engaging
in high-speed pursuits.9 9 Previously, written guidelines regarding
high-speed chases were almost nonexistent.1 0 0
In New Jersey, the question of whether a police officer
should pursue a suspect has traditionally been left to the discretion of the officer.' 0 ' Without training or guidelines regarding
and Their Employers, 26 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 257 (1976) (police susceptible to civil
actions based on common law intentional torts and deprivation of civil rights).
97 Dr. Kirkham has experience in over 325 civil actions involving police officers.
Blodgett, supra note 96, at 36.
98 Id.

99 See Territo, supra note 96, at 31. The Baltimore police department has instituted a strict policy providing that "[i]t is the policy of this department not to become involved in high-speed pursuit driving." Struck, supra note 1, at 10A, col.5.
The department instead uses five helicopters, which the police say "can get over
any part of the city within 90 seconds." Id. at col. 6; see also INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, THE PATROL OPERATION 42 (3d ed. 1977) (discussing the
advantages of helicopters over police cars during a pursuit).
It has also been suggested that roadblocks could be used as an alternative to
high-speed pursuits. See, e.g., McDermott, Police in Pursuit, Sunday Herald-News
(New Jersey), Jan. 6, 1985, at B 1,col. 1. Using police cars as a roadblock, however,
can be as dangerous as a high-speed pursuit and should only be used when absolutely necessary. See generally J. SCHWARZ, POLICE ROADBLOCK OPERATIONS (1962)
(detailed discussion of when and how to use roadblocks).
100 See Physicians for Automotive Safety, supra note 1, at 3. One of the few statements on high-speed pursuits appeared in 1966 by the International Association of
Chiefs of Police (IACP). Id. The statement advocating the use of high-speed chases
read as follows:
WHEREAS, Police agencies are established to preserve the peace and
defend the public welfare against the lawless, and are legally committed
to achieve these objectives; and
WHEREAS, The accomplishment of such missions often requires the
immediate apprehension of the lawless by means of pursuit; and
WHEREAS, Such activity must not be arbitrarily limited; now, therefore, be it.
RESOLVED, That the International Association of Chiefs of Police reaffirm its conviction that pursuit is justified if required to accomplish the
legitimate objectives of law enforcement.
Id.
In 1973, the IACP modified its position, issued a comprehensive model pursuit
policy, and urged local agencies to adopt written pursuit policies. Beckman, supra
note 1, at 36.
101 See Marques, Bergen Chiefs Debate Worth: Chases Cause Tragedy, Herald-News
(NewJersey), Oct. 23, 1975, at 17, col.3. Furthermore, ArthurJ. Sills, a former New
Jersey attorney general, noted that in certain circumstances it would be necessary
for state troopers to exercise their judgment on whether to pursue a fleeing offender. Physicians for Automotive Safety, supra note 1, at 17.
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pursuits,10 2 it is not surprising that police chases often
culminated in accidents. 0 3 Nonetheless, many police departments have neglected to institute written policies.' 0 " Thus, accidents will continue to occur unless detailed policies are
promulgated to cover adequately all aspects of a police pursuit."5 Policies that give general statements discouraging highspeed pursuits, while laudable, fail to provide sufficient criteria to
follow when a chase becomes necessary.
A good police pursuit policy should list the various factors
that must be considered by an officer when making a pursuit decision.' 6' These factors should include the following: the seri102 New Jersey police academies were not required to instruct officers on the dangers of high-speed pursuits until 1979. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:17B-71(o) (West
Cum. Supp. 1984-1985); see also infra notes 117-143 and accompanying text (discussion of police training in high-speed tactics).
103 See supra note 1. An analysis of the cases reported to the Physicians for Automotive Safety revealed the following:
1.
. . One out of five pursuits ends in death
2. Five out of ten pursuits end in serious injuries
3.
. . Seven out of ten pursuits end in an accident
4. One out of 25 killed is a policeman
5.
. . Four out of five pursuits are for minor offenses
6. More than 500 Americans die each year as a result of rapid pursuit
by police.
Physicians for Automotive Safety, supra note 1, at 14.
104 Detective Thomas Brennan, an instructor at the Newark Police Academy on
high-speed pursuits, estimates that many smaller police departments have no written pursuit policy. Interview with Thomas Brennan, Detective, Newark Police Department, in Newark, New Jersey (Apr. 9, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Interview with
Detective Thomas Brennan].
105 According to New Jersey's Police Training Commission, a police officer

"[w]ithout a clearly defined agency policy . . . is more likely to . . . [over-react

and disregard proper caution or . . . [h]esitate and fail to respond to the situation." Police Training Commission, N.J. Div. of Criminal Justice, Basic Course, Instructional Unit 7.3, Pursuit and Emergency Driving 4 (undated) [hereinafter cited
as Police Training Commission].
Criticism against establishing policies and guidelines focuses on the advantages to criminals inherent in a restrictive pursuit policy. See G. PAYTON, PATROL
PROCEDURE AND ENFORCEMENT CONCEPTS 321 (6th ed. 1982). One author claims
that a total prohibition of pursuits would "invite wholesale escape attempts." D.
SCHULTZ, POLICE PURSUIT DRIVING HANDBOOK 1 (1979). Another notes that a restrictive policy would give notice "to every nut behind a steering wheel that all he
has to do to evade apprehension is put his foot on the gas." Struck, supra note 1, at
I OA, col.5 (quoting Robert Angrisani, an official of the International Association of
Chiefs of Police). A good, detailed policy, however, does not have to restrict the
officer when he feels he must pursue a suspect. The purpose of a policy is to improve the officer's awareness and handling of the various factors that must be considered throughout a high-speed pursuit. See generally Newark Police Department,
General Order No. 76-4, Pursuit Driving (June 25, 1976) (example of a good highspeed pursuit policy).
106 See Territo, sipra note 96, at 32.
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ousness of the offense; the road, traffic, and weather conditions;
the condition and type of police vehicle involved; the number of
pedestrians in the vicinity; the type of area-such as school, residential, or business district; the possibility of apprehension in the
future; the officer's familiarity with the area; the officer's training
and experience in high-speed driving; and the possibility of successfully apprehending the suspect. 0 7 The officer should constantly reevaluate these factors in order to decide how fast to
pursue the fugitive and when to terminate the pursuit. 0 8s If the
level of danger to innocent persons outweighs the importance of
an immediate apprehension, then the pursuit should end.' 0 9
The number of police vehicles to be used during a highspeed chase should also be addressed by a pursuit policy." 0 As
more police cars become involved, the chance of an accident involving innocent persons increases."' Generally, a pursuit
should be limited to one or two police vehicles with additional
2
units assisting by placing themselves in strategic locations." 1
Additional guidelines must be formulated for chases involv107 Id. These factors were compiled from the results of a national survey conducted by the Department of Criminal Justice of the University of South Florida in
Tampa. Id. at 3 1. Forty-five police departments from 37 states submitted copies of
their policies on emergency response and high-speed pursuit. Id. at 32. For a more
extensive outline of these factors, see Police Training Commission, supra note 105,
at 12-14. See also G. PAYTON, supra note 105, at 323-26 (listing additional factors to
remember during a high-speed pursuit).
The same factors should also be considered at trial by the jury in order to
determine whether a police officer was negligent or reasonable in his execution of a
high-speed pursuit. See infra notes 162-164 and accompanying text. It should be
noted that this list is not intended to be exhaustive.
108 See T. ADAMS, POLICE FIELD OPERATIONS 65 (2d ed. 1985). In determining
how fast to pursue a suspect, the Physicians for Automotive Safety recommend a
maximum of 20 miles per hour over the speed limit. Physicians for Automotive
Safety, supra note 1, at 13. Establishing a maximum speed, however, may be too
arbitrary because of the different circumstances that may arise during a police pursuit. See Territo, supra note 96, at 32. Of the 45 police departments that responded
to the University of South Florida survey, only one provided "a cap on the maximum speed for high speed pursuit." Id.; see also supra note 107 (explaining the circumstances of the University's survey).
109 See Territo, supra note 96, at 34.
110 See id.
I II Id. at 32-33. An inadvertent collision is easy to visualize when many police
cars are approaching the same area at high speeds. See id. An example of such a
collision occurred in NewJersey in 1979, when police cars from Paramus and Fort
Lee, together with two Bergen County patrol cars, chased a suspect in a stolen car.
Bergen Record (NewJersey), Aug. 14, 1979, at A6, col.l. Although the suspect was
caught, the chase ended in a collision between three of the police cars. Id.
112 The policies studied in the University of South Florida survey consistently
stated that no more than two police vehicles were to be directly involved in the
high-speed pursuit. See Territo, supra note 96, at 32; see also T. ADAMS, s1pra note
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ing unmarked police cars."' The lack of distinctive police markings increases the risk of an accident; thus, stricter standards for
conducting a pursuit are needed.' Both unmarked and marked
police cars should be required to use emergency lights and sirens
throughout the pursuit as a warning to other vehicles.1 5 Activating these devices should be a police
officer's first reaction when
1 16
beginning a high-speed pursuit.
B.

Police Training in High-Speed Pursuit Tactics

When a high-speed pursuit situation arises, a police officer
must make split-second judgments. 17 Relevant factors must be
examined instantaneously in order to determine whether the
danger to innocent persons outweighs the need for immediate
arrest of the suspect." 8 The dilemma in finding the proper balance between letting violators of the law escape and insuring the
safety of innocent persons is difficult to resolve." 9 If a highspeed pursuit does ensue, the officer must be extremely alert and
at peak efficiency throughout the chase. 120 He must remain aware
of the necessity of objectively evaluating his pursuit of a sus108, at 66 (no more than two or three police cars need be directly involved in a
pursuit).
113 See Territo, supra note 96, at 33. Most of the policies submitted to the University of South Florida survey did not discuss the question of unmarked cars. Id.
114 See id. One police department's policy states: "If the pursuit is initially created
by an unmarked unit, the unit shall abandon the pursuit when a marked unit is in a
position to assume the pursuit." Id.
115 Id. at 32. Unmarked police cars are frequently equipped with portable lights
and sirens attached to a magnet for deployment on the roof. Id. at 33. When using
a siren, a police officer must remember that not all individuals will be able to hear it
because of hearing loss or loud radio playing. Police Training Commission, supra
note 105, at 20. In addition, the faster the police officer travels, the less effective
the warning becomes. Id.
116 Police Training Commission, supra note 105, at 7; cf. G. PAYTON, supra note
105, at 324 (only the police cars in direct pursuit should use sirens). A number of
lawsuits have arisen because the officer failed to use either the lights' or the siren.
See, e.g., Pagels v. City of San Francisco, 135 Cal. App. 2d 152, 286 P.2d 877 (1955)
(officer failed to use red lights or sirens); Butler v. Russell, 101 Ga. App. 826, 115
S.E.2d 194 (1960) (vehicle not equipped with siren and officer failed to use emergency lights); Moore v. Travelers Indem. Co., 352 So.2d 270 (La. Ct. App. 1978)
(officer failed to use siren and emergency lights); Herron v. Silbaugh, 436 Pa. 339,
260 A.2d 755 (1970) (officer failed to use siren).
117 Struck, "upra note 1, at 10A, col.6 (quoting Calvin A. Beacock, a veteran police
officer who compiled a survey on high-speed pursuits for the Ontario Police
Commission).
118 See T. ADAMS, supra note 108, at 64-65; see also supra note 107 and accompanying text (listing the factors to be examined).
119 See 60 Minutes, supra note 5, at 5; D. SCHULTZ, supra note 105, at 1.
120 T. ADAMS, supra note 108, at 64.
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pect.' 2 ' All too often, an officer becomes so personally involved
in the capture of a suspect that the safety of others is forgotten.12 2 The chase then becomes a matter of professional pride in
driving skill; the officer concentrates only on winning. 123 Therefore, police officers must have training in high-speed driving in
124
order to make the sudden decisions that are necessary.
A driver in a high-speed pursuit will also undergo physiological changes as a result of the danger and excitement of a
chase. 1 25 His heartbeat and blood pressure will rise, and large
amounts of adrenalin will flow into his bloodstream. 1 26 This will
create an illusion of slow motion, producing an erroneous perception of the speeds of the vehicles and a tendency to be overconfident in executing the chase. 12 7 Unless an officer receives
training, he may be unaware of the potential psychological and
physiological changes within him, and he may take reckless
12 8
chances that could otherwise be avoided.
121 See id. at 67. An officer must avoid the "macho" element in a pursuit. See
Struck, supra note 1, at 10A, col.6. When a patrolman's peers hear what is happening over the radio, it is not easy for the officer to abandon the pursuit and let the
suspect escape. Id. New Jersey's Police Training Commission instructional manual
on pursuit driving states that there should not "be any suggestions or implication
that by dropping the pursuit the officer is lacking in courage or determination."
Police Training Commission, supra note 105, at 11.
122 D. SCHULTZ, supra note 105, at 41.
123 T. ADAMS, supra note 108, at 67. Detective Thomas Brennan, the high-speed
pursuit instructor at the Newark Police Academy, believes that the police officer's
need to catch the suspect at all costs is derived from a "T.V. chase mentality."
Interview with Detective Thomas Brennan, supra note 104. Television shows often
portray the hero as engaging in dangerous chases with little regard for innocent
persons. Detective Brennan feels that written policies and training are needed to
"eliminate the unnecessary chases-the T.V. chases." Id.
124 In a survey of Tennessee law enforcement officers, it was "found that officers
who received emergency/pursuit driver's training were significantly less frequently
involved in on-duty police motor vehicle accidents than officers who had not received this training." Miller, Police Motor Vehicle Accidents: An Administrative Concern,
POLICE CHIEF, Jan. 1983, at 25, 26.
125 See D. SCHULTZ, supra note 105, at 41.
126 Id.; see 60 Minutes, supra note 5, at 5.
127 D. SCHULTZ, supra note 105, at 42; see also Struck, supra note 1, at 10A, col.5
("[y]our brain is moving so fast that things seem to go into slow motion") (quoting
Brian Traynor, veteran police officer and now an official of the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration).
128 See D. SCHULTZ, supra note 105, at 42. Because a police officer may become
personally involved in a high-speed pursuit, some police departments have placed
responsibility for pursuit on supervisory personnel. Territo, supra note 96, at 34;
see, e.g., Newark Police Department, supra note 105, at 5, 7. Supervisors are removed from the excitement of the pursuit and should be able to decide objectively
whether a pursuit should be terminated. Interview with Detective Thomas Brennan, supra note 104. One commentator states, however, that "[t]here is little evi-
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High-speed pursuit training should consist of lectures, movies, and behind-the-wheel training. 1 29 In New Jersey, the law requires that courses on high-speed chases be included in the
regular training curriculum. 3 ° Although no behind-the-wheel
training for high-speed pursuits is mandated, 13 1 some police
academies offer courses in defensive driving, which can be applied to high-speed situations. 132 Most officers, however, will not
receive behind-the-wheel training because of the high cost of establishing training areas.1 33 Individual municipalities lack the
funds necessary to set up extensive training courses. 13 Paradoxically, large sums of money may be expended as a result of civil
13 5
litigation arising from high-speed pursuits.
dence to support the notion that police supervisors regularly intercede and order
officers to terminate a high speed pursuit." Territo, supra note 96, at 34.
129 See Miller, supra note 124, at 27.
130 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:17B-71(o) (West Cum. Supp. 1984-1985). This section provides as follows: "The commission is vested with the power, responsibility
and duty . . . [t]o furnish approved schools, for inclusion in their regular police
training courses and curriculum with information concerning the advisability of
high speed chases, the risk caused thereby, and the benefits resulting therefrom."
Id. Pursuant to this statute, the Police Training Commission has established guidelines for a course on pursuit driving. See generally Police Training Commission,
supra note 105. Each police academy is required to provide at least two hours of
classroom instruction on high-speed pursuit. Interview with Detective Thomas
Brennan, supra note 104.
131 Telephone interview with Captain Robert Herb, Traffic Safety Supervisor and
DWI Strike Force Coordinator for New Jersey's Bergen County Police Department
(Apr. 8, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Telephone interview with Captain Robert
Herb].
132 The New Jersey State Police Academy in Sea Girt provides a rigorous defensive driving course for state police cadets. See McDermott, supra note 99, at B2,
col.2-3. It includes "22 hours in behind-the-wheel training and a National Safety
Council course on evasive driving." Id. at col.3. Cadets from municipal police departments who train at Sea Girt, however, do not receive this training. Id. The
Bergen County Police and Fire Academy in Mahwah, New Jersey provides behindthe-wheel training in defensive driving on a specially designed course. Id. at col.4.
The course instructors receive their training at the National Academy for Professional Driving in Dallas, Texas. Id.
133 For example, the Passaic County Police Academy in Pompton Lakes, New
Jersey has no behind-the-wheel training and does not plan to institute such training
because of the lack of both facilities and funds, Id. at col.3-4. Leo A. Culloo, the
executive director of the Police Training Commission, states that providing behindthe-wheel training can be a "very expensive proposition." Id. at col. 1. Factors such
as the need for a large area equipped with skid pans, instructors for each vehicle,
and the wear and tear on the vehicles add to the cost of the program. Id.
134 See, e.g.,
60 Minutes, supra note 5, at 7 (a Detroit police officer gets very little
training in pursuit driving because of costs involved).
135 E.g., Biscoe v. Arlington County, 738 F.2d 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ($4.35 million awarded to plaintiffs), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 909 (1985); see also 60 Minutes,
supra note 5, at 7 (verdicts from high-speed pursuit accidents in Detroit far exceed
cost of training all police officers).
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A possible remedy for alleviating the costs of training in New
Jersey can be borrowed from California's Commission on Peace
Officer Standards and Training (POST).' 3 6 Under the POST programs, a five dollar fee is charged for every ten dollars assessed
in fines, penalties, or forfeitures for criminal offenses. 13 7 These
charges are deposited in a Penalty Assessment Fund. 138 POST
receives 27.75% of the money in the fund and uses it for law
enforcement training purposes. 39 So long as POST's training
standards are met, local governments are reimbursed for their
officers' training. 140 Thus, police training programs are funded
by violators of the law rather than by law-abiding citizens.' 4 ' A
program similar to POST could be implemented in NewJersey to
finance training areas for behind-the-wheel training. 4 2 If the
program is organized by a state agency, such as the Police Training Commission, only a few training locations would be needed
14 3
throughout the state.
C.

Conclusion

Regardless of the cost, the establishment of a comprehensive
high-speed pursuit training program would benefit municipalities
and police departments. Civil litigation against municipalities for
136 For a detailed summary of the POST program, see COMMISSION
OFFICER STANDARDS & TRAINING, 1983-84 ANNUAL REPORT "SERVICE

ON

PEACE

AND PRO-

1-3.
137 Id. at 4.

GRESS"

138 Id. The five-dollar fee includes fines for moving violations of California's Vehicle Code. Id.
139 Id. POST provides training that is applicable to various stages of a police officer's career. Id. at 3. Training is required for all new officers, supervisors, and
managers. Id. Periodic training in advanced officer courses is also required. Id.
140 Id. at 3. POST is a voluntary program that not only establishes training opportunities, but reimburses municipalities for training costs, including salary, tuition, travel, and subsistence. Id. at 3, 5.
141 Id. at 4. Under the POST reimbursement program, more than $22.2 million
was allocated in the 1983-1984 fiscal year. Id. at 5. In 1983, the training costs for
30,258 officers were reimbursed. Id.
142 A POST-type program should be established by the Legislature. A statewide
program not only provides resources for training, but encourages uniform standards throughout a state. See id. at 3.
143 Telephone interview with Captain Robert Herb, supra note 131. Captain
Herb proposes the establishment of a state program run by the Police Training
Commission. Id. According to Captain Herb, the program would consist of a oneday course. Id. Locations would be established at three sites on appropriate state
property, such as airports or National Guard runways. Id. A date would be selected
and a police academy would bring its trainees to the location. Id. Foam would be
used to simulate hydroplaning, and vehicles would be provided with roll bars. Id.
This training would coincide with classroom indoctrination on high-speed pursuits.
Id.
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injuries caused in a high-speed pursuit is usually based on negligence in training the police officers involved.' 44 The establishment of a good training program would greatly reduce such
causes of action. A detailed pursuit policy is similarly beneficial
in litigation. If an officer understands the factors behind his decisions during the pursuit, he will be able to 4demonstrate
why he
5
was correct in the execution of the pursuit.'
Well-formulated policies and training programs will reduce
the number of accidents caused by high-speed pursuits. Injuries
will be further curtailed if communication between police departments is coordinated. 4' 6 Pursuits often begin in one township
and end in another, causing police officers from different municipalities to become directly involved in the chase. If these police
officers cannot communicate with each other, the possiblity of an
accident increases. The organization of a coordinated communication system between hundreds of independent municipal police departments is a formidable task, however. Consequently, in
order to create a proficient communication network, it might be
beneficial to centralize NewJersey's police structure into regional
police departments. 147
144 E.g., Smith v. Nieves, 197 N.J. Super. 609, 485 A.2d 1066 (App. Div. 1984);
Swellick v. Mottola, No. L-24285-75 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Apr. 19, 1977).
145 Schultz, High Speed Chases: Vehicle Pursuit vs. the Lawsuit, POLICE CHIEF, Jan.
1983, at 32, 33.
146 Radio communication can be used effectively to pursue a suspect in coordination with other police cars within the same police department. T. ADAMS, supra note
108, at 65. Communication between police cars from different municipalities, however, can often be convoluted. For example, if a Bloomfield police officer pursues a
suspect into the neighboring city of Newark, he must notify the Bloomfield dispatcher, who then places a phone call to the Newark dispatcher, who in turn notifies
the appropriate Newark police car of the chase. Interview with Detective Thomas
Brennan, supra note 104. Joseph Delaney, Chief of Police in Paramus, New Jersey
believes that the State Police Emergency Network (SPEN) radio can be used effectively to capture fleeing suspects. McDermott, supra note 99, at B2, col.5. A single
SPEN broadcast can notify all surrounding communities of a pursuit in progress.
Id. While the use of the SPEN radio can cut down on communication time, it still
requires the coordination of officers from different municipalities by separate
dispatchers.
147 New York's Nassau County is an example of a centralized police department.
In Nassau County, most of the county is divided into police districts patrolled by
the county police department. Telephone interview with Sergeant Pete Matuza,
Public Information Officer of the Nassau County Police Department (Apr. 26,
1985).
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LEGAL ANALYSIS

Negligence

Smith v. Nieves held that a police officer could be liable for his
negligence during a pursuit when the pursued vehicle was involved in an accident. 148 This decision was based on the court's
interpretation of Roll v. Timberman. 4' 9 The Smith court focused on
the Roll court's statement that there was "no evidence of actionable negligence" by the defendant police officer.' 50 Based on this
language, and on the fact that the Roll court did not hold that the
officer could not be liable if he had been negligent, the Smith
court determined that police officers were subject to civil liability
for a negligent pursuit. 15 ' This interpretation of Roll is supported
by the Roll court's statement that the defendant's motion for "involuntary dismissal made at the close of the case should have
been granted."' 5 2 The phrase "at the close of the case" implied
that the case correctly went to trial, but then should have been
53
dismissed because of its particular facts.
A large part of the Roll dictum, however, appeared to adopt
the view that police officers were immune from liability because
they could not be the proximate cause of injuries caused by the
pursued vehicle.' 5" For example, the Roll court noted that there
are two different theories on the proximate cause issue. 5 5 The
minority view holds that a pursuing officer's liability is a question
for the jury. 56 The majority view "holds that the police officer is
not liable."' 5 7 Because the Roll court expressly rejected the minority view, 158 it seems clear that the Roll court believed the issue
should never go to trial. Despite these implications, the Smith
court chose not to overrule Roll; instead, it limited the Roll holdSmith, 197 N.J. Super. at 612-13, 485 A.2d at 1067-68.
See id.; see also supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (explaining the Smith
court's interpretation of Roll).
150 Smith, 197 N.J. Super. at 612,485 A.2d at 1067 (quoting Roll, 94 N.J. Super. at
148
149

538, 229 A.2d at 285).
11 See Smith, 197 N.J. Super. at 612, 485 A.2d at 1067.
Roll, 94 N.J. Super. at 538, 229 A.2d at 285.
153 It is unknown whether the defendant in Roll made a motion for summary
judgment before the trial. If this motion was made in addition to the involuntary
dismissal motion at the end of the trial, the Roll appellate court would have had a
152

choice as to which motion should have been granted.
154 See Roll, 94 N.J. Super. at 536-37, 229 A.2d at 284.
155 See id.
157

Id. at 537, 229 A.2d at 284.
Id.

158

See id.

156
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ing to the facts of that case.' 59
The Smith court's ruling that an officer could be liable for
injuries caused by a fleeing suspect was ultimately correct. Even
if the officer is not involved in the actual collision, it is possible
that his conduct can satisfy the traditional elements of a negligence claim.' 60 The first step in establishing negligence is to determine whether a reasonable person under the circumstances
would have acted in the same manner as the defendant.' 6' In a
negligence suit arising from a high-speed chase, the totality of
the surrounding circumstances should be examined. 6'62 The factors considered should not be limited to whether an officer used
his emergency lights and siren or acted pursuant to statutory
law.' 63 An officer can act within the law and still behave unreasonably and negligently.164
Once an officer's conduct is found to be unreasonable, he
159 See Smith, 197 N.J. Super. at 612-13, 485 A.2d at 1067-68. An examination of
the majority cases cited in Roll reveals at least one case that supports the Smith
court's interpretation of Roll. See Wrubel v. State, 11 Misc.2d 878, 174 N.Y.S.2d
687 (Ct. Cl. 1958). In Wrubel, the court specifically stated that an officer is not liable
for using "whatever means necessary to make an arrest . . . unless he exceeds proper
and rational bounds or acts in a negligent, careless or wanton manner." Id. at 880, 174
N.Y.S.2d at 689 (emphasis added).
160 The traditional formula for establishing negligence includes the following
elements:
1. A duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the person to
conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others
against unreasonable risks.
2. A failure on the person's part to conform to the standard required: a
breach of the duty ...
3. A reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and the
resulting injury. This is what is commonly known as "legal cause," or
"proximate cause," and which includes the notion of cause in fact.
4. Actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of another.
W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 164-65 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER & KEETON].
161 See id. at 175.

162 See supra note 107 and accompanying text (list of criteria that should be used
to determine if officer's actions were reasonable).
163 See generally id. Courts may be tempted to allow liability against the police
officer only if he disregards the basic duties required in high-speed pursuits, such as
failure to use emergency devices when engaging in a pursuit. See, e.g., Moore v.
Travelers Indem. Co., 352 So.2d 270 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (police officer liable for
failure to use siren and emergency lights); Herron v. Silbaugh, 436 Pa. 339, 260
A.2d 755 (1970) (police officer liable for failure to use siren). Under a negligence
cause of action, however, the test is one of reasonableness, not job performance.
See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 160, at 175.
'64 See, e.g., Wrubel v. State, 11 Misc. 2d 878, 880, 174 N.Y.S.2d 687, 689 (Ct. Cl.
1958) (possible for police "officer to be negligent or reckless in the performance of
his duties").
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will not be liable unless his conduct is the "proximate cause" of
the injury. 65 To prove proximate cause, it must first be shown
that the injuries probably would not have occurred without the
defendant's actions-a concept known as "causation in fact."' 1 66
This burden of proof can easily be met in many high-speed pursuit accidents. Ordinarily, the pursued driver's reckless behavior
officer; if there were
is a direct result of being chased by a police
67
accident.'
no
be
would
there
chase,
no
If causation in fact is established, the plaintiff must still
demonstrate the defendant's legal liability in order to satisfy the
issue of proximate cause. 168 This determination of proximate
cause has been based on various theories.1 69 The most widely
used test is that of foreseeability-the defendant is liable if a reasonable person could have foreseen the consequences of the conduct in question. 170 The same factors used to determine the
reasonableness of the defendant's conduct should be used to de165 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 160, at 263.
166 See id. at 264-66. The concept of causation in

fact has evolved into a rule,
commonly designated as the "but for" or "sine qua non" rule. Id. at 266. This rule
states that "[t]he defendant's conduct is a cause of the event if the event would not
have occurred but for that conduct; conversely, the defendant's conduct is not a
cause of the event, if the event would have occurred without it." Id. In applying the
above rule, care must be taken that the rule, by itself, is not used to decide the
question of liability. See id. Other considerations may prevent liability because one
act may set an infinite number of events in motion. See id.
167 Even when the defendant police officers were found not to be the proximate
cause of the accident, some courts have acknowledged that the officers were the
"cause in fact" of the pursued's reckless driving. See, e.g., Chambers v. Ideal Pure
Milk Co., 245 S.W.2d 589, 591 (Ky. 1952). In situations where the pursued had
been driving recklessly before the chase began, however, the police officer should
rarely be the "cause in fact" of the pursued's reckless driving.
168 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 160, at 272-73.
169 Id. at 273. Among the various theories of proximate cause, there are two
theories that occur most often. Id. One theory states "that the scope of liability
should ordinarily extend to but not beyond the scope of the 'foreseeable risks.' " Id.
A contrasting theory states "that the scope of liability should ordinarily extend to
but not beyond all 'direct' (or 'directly traceable') consequences and those indirect
consequences that are foreseeable." Id. Under the latter approach, a defendant is
liable for all consequences that follow in direct sequence from his act, even if those
In re Polemis, [1921] 3 K.B. 560
consequences were unforeseeable. Id. at 294; e.g.,
(defendant employer liable when its workman dropped plank into ship's hold, causing spark, which ignited petrol vapor and destroyed ship and cargo). This "direct
consequences" theory appears to be losing ground to the "foreseeable risks" approach, especially since foreseeability is often used as a factor in considering
whether consequences were direct. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 160, at 295.
170 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 160, at 297. Some cases have held that the
defendant is liable if any risk of harm to the plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable,
even if the specific harm was unforeseeable. E.g., In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338
F.2d 708, 726 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965).
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cide whether the consequences of his conduct were foreseeable. 7' At least in some instances, it is clear that a police officer
should foresee that a high-speed chase will more likely than not
result in an injury to an innocent person.
In accidents between the pursued and an innocent third
party, it may also be argued that the pursued is an intervening
cause that precludes the police officer's liability. 7 2 This argument is weak, however, because the term "intervening" refers to
events that occur after a defendant has acted negligently.' 7 3 In a
high-speed pursuit, the fleeing suspect is part of the chase from
the outset. The pursued's intervention, therefore, does not occur after the officer's negligent act. The pursued is a part of the
event and cannot be considered an intervening cause. In any
event, courts have generally extended a defendant's liability to
those intervening events that were foreseeable. 174 As stated previously, in some circumstances, it will be foreseeable that a pursued automobile is likely to be involved in an accident.
B.

New Jersey Tort Claims Act

In New Jersey, the state's Tort Claims Act must be considered when examining the potential civil liability of a municipality.
The defendant municipalities in Smith v. Nieves argued that sec171 See supra note 107 and accompanying text (list of factors that may be used to
determine if the consequences of a police officer's action were foreseeable).
172 An intervening cause that precludes liability for a defendant's negligent act is
sometimes termed a "superseding cause." See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 160, at
301. The Restatement of Torts defines a superseding cause as "an act of a third
person or other force which by its intervention prevents the actor from being liable
for harm to another which his antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 440 (1965). The Restatement also
defines an intervening force as "one which actively operates in producing harm to
another after the actor's negligent act or omission has been committed." Id. § 441.
In New Jersey, a superseding cause has been defined as a negligent act that "so
entirely supersedes the operation of the defendant's negligence that it alone, without his negligence contributing thereto in the slightest degree, produces the injury." Daniel v.
Gielty Trucking Co., 116 N.J.L. 172, 174, 182 A. 638, 639 (N.J. 1936).
173 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 160, at 301. The following example is useful
in understanding the relation of time to intervening causes:
If the defendant sets a fire with a strong wind blowing at the time, which
carries the fire to the plaintiff's property, the wind does not intervene,
since it was already in operation; but if the fire is set first, and the wind
springs up later, it is then an intervening cause.
Id. (footnote omitted).
174 Id. at 302; see, e.g., Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959);
Martin v. Bengue, Inc., 25 N.J. 359, 136 A.2d 626 (1957); Torsiello v. Whitehall
Laboratories, 165 N.J. Super. 311, 398 A.2d 132 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 81 N.J.
50, 404 A.2d 1150 (1979).
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tion 59:2-3(d) of the Act barred the plaintiff's direct claim of negligence for improperly training its police officers to conduct highspeed pursuits.17 5 This provision, however, does not per se provide immunity.1 76 As the Smith court noted, a municipality is not
immune from liability if its discretionary action in allocating its
resources when faced with competing priorities was palpably unreasonable. 7 7 Although the Smith court did not define palpably
unreasonable conduct,1 78 it placed the burden of proving that its
conduct was not palpably unreasonable upon the defendant municipality. 79 Therefore, in a negligence action against a municipality for failure to train its police officers properly in high-speed
175 Smith, 197 N.J. Super. at 614, 485 A.2d at 1068; see infra note 77 (text of the
relevant section of the Tort Claims Act). The Act also provides immunity for public
employees when performing a discretionary act as opposed to a ministerial act. See
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:3-2 (West 1982). In examining the discretionary-ministerial
dichotomy, one court noted that almost every "act, no matter how directly ministerial, [involves] some discretion in the manner of its performance." Czyzewski v.
Schwartz, 110 NJ. Super. 255, 260, 265 A.2d 173, 176 (App. Div. 1970) (quoting
Ham v. County of Los Angeles, 46 Cal. App. 148, 162, 189 P. 462, 468 (1920)).
Therefore, a police officer's actions in the regular course of his duties will be considered ministerial functions. Id. at 261, 265 A.2d at 176. When an officer observes
a motor vehicle violation, he has a duty to act. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:5-25 (West
Cum. Supp. 1984-1985). Once he does act, his actions are ministerial, even if there
is discretion as to how to perform that duty. See Ritter v. Castellini, 173 NJ. Super.
509, 513-14, 414 A.2d 614, 616-17 (Law Div. 1980). Thus, an officer who is engaged in a high-speed pursuit is performing a ministerial function and is subject to
liability if he is negligent.
176 Brown v. Brown, 86 N.J. 565, 578, 432 A.2d 493, 500 (1981).
177 Smith, 197 N.J. Super. at 614, 485 A.2d at 1068 (citing Brown v. Brown, 86
N.J. 565, 578-79, 432 A.2d 493, 500 (1981)). Although it appears several times in
the statute, the term "palpably unreasonable conduct" is not defined by the Tort
Claims Act. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:2-3(d), :3-2, :4-2(b) (West 1982). The Legislature recognized that the New Jersey Supreme Court established the "palpably
unreasonable" standard in Bergen v. Koppenal, 52 NJ. 478, 246 A.2d 442 (1968).
See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:2-3 comment, :4-2 comment (West 1982). The Bergen
court, however, also failed to define the term. See Bergen, 52 N.J. at 480, 246 A.2d at
444. The appellate division, though, has described "palpably unreasonable conduct" as imposing a tougher standard of proof than ordinary negligence. Williams
v. rown of Phillipsburg, 171 N.J. Super. 278, 286, 408 A.2d 827, 831 (App. Div.
1 )79).
7 See Smith, 197 N.J. Super. at 614, 485 A.2d at 1068. The court remanded the
case without discussing what might constitute "palpably unreasonable conduct" because the municipalities made no showing of the competing demands for their resources. Id. at 614, 615, 485 A.2d at 1068, 1069.
17) See id. at 614, 485 A.2d at 1068. By contrast, in an earlier case, the appellate
division imposed the burden of demonstrating "palpably unreasonable conduct"
on the person seeking recovery from a municipality. See Williams v. Town of Phillipsburg, 171 N.J. Super. 278, 286, 408 A.2d 827, 831 (App. Div. 1979). The ll'iliams court interpreted § 59:4-2 of the Tort Claims Act, which expressly requires
the plaintiff to establish a public entity's liability. See id. at 281, 408 A.2d at 829;
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-2 (West 1982). Section 59:2-3 of the Act, however, does not
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pursuit tactics, the municipality must demonstrate that its resources were used on projects more important than pursuit training. If the municipality is unable to make such a showing, a court
may conclude that the municipality's exercise of discretion was
palpably unreasonable and that the municipality is therefore
liable.
In determining whether high-speed pursuit training deserves
priority over competing demands, it is important to note that
New Jersey requires certain information concerning high-speed
chases to be included in police training courses. 8 0 The Smith
court, by pointing out the relevancy of this requirement, apparently believed that high-speed training should be given a high
priority.' 8 ' Moreover, public policy considerations require a municipality to give high-speed training a high priority. The danger
to innocent persons is greatly increased when a high-speed chase
arises. 8 2 In addition, more police injuries occur in motor vehicle
accidents than in any other police activity. 183 Clearly, high-speed
training deserves high priority, and municipalities should be
found liable for the plaintiff's injuries if they fail to train their
officers properly.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Police officers and municipalities should be liable when their
negligent actions in high-speed pursuits contribute to the injuries or deaths of innocent persons.184 This is not a criticism of all
high-speed pursuits, but a condemnation of current policies and
practices, which allow unreasonably dangerous chases to occur.
Just as a police officer should not be allowed to carry a gun unless
he is properly trained and certified, a police officer should not be
allowed to operate a police vehicle unless he is properly trained
and prepared for all possible situations.18 5 The Smith court's imposition of potential liability should prompt the establishment of
detailed written policies and comprehensive training in pursuit
specifically allocate the burden of proof. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-3(d) (West

1982).
180 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:17B-71(o) (West Cum. Supp. 1984-1985); see supra note
130 (text of provision requiring inclusion of high-speed chase information).
181 See Smith, 197 N.J. Super. at 614, 485 A.2d at 1068-69.
182 See supra note 1.
183 See Miller, supra note 124, at 25.
184 Cf. Davis, An Approach to Legal Control of the Police, 52 TEX. L. REV. 703, 717-22
(1974) (advocating municipal liability rather than police liability for torts committed by police officers).
185 Beckman, smpra note 1, at 36.
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tactics. This will help ensure that a police officer will act reasonably when confronted with a pursuit situation. The effect will be
a saving of lives-the officer's, the pursued's, and the innocent
bystander's-and a decrease in burdensome lawsuits against police officers and municipalities.
Sean M. Carlin

